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The paper is a first attempt of interpreting result of various surveys that seem to contradict the 
current mainstream scholarly belief that it is procedural fairness in law enforcement that is crucial to 
legitimate law and authorities that apply law in everyday practice. This approach also argues that 
sanctioning, applying penalty against those who break the law is highly inefficient (costly and its 
deterrence effect in fact minimal). Based on Hungarian survey data collected by our team2 as well as 
on some other published and unpublished data I will attack the above described theory, at least as a 
general theory that supposed to be valid anywhere outside the Anglo-American World. Most 
importantly I will argue that sanctions play a crucial role in determining people’s law-abiding 
behavior. I am convinced that – despite some comparative attempts to test and prove to theory in a 
non-Anglo-Saxon context – the theory may be highly ethnocentric, thus, it is questionable if that fits 
to other social-cultural-legal systems, such as the one in Eastern Europe.  
  
                                                          
1 The present paper has been published with the support of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice, within the 
framework of the program entitled 'The Elevation of the Standards of Legal Education 
2 The survey was financed by the Hungarian Research Fund within OTKA 105552 (Legal conciousness of the 
Hungarin population) project.  
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A critical overview of the theory 
A sociological approach 
There are several attempts to identify main reasons, or motivations of compliance, i.e. “obeying the 
law”. Nevertheless, on a very abstract level, there may be two explanation depending on what one 
thinks of human nature.(March & Olsen, 2004) Namely, if humans are considered rational utility 
maximizing individuals, or if – in the opposite way – they are conceived as members of social groups 
and society at large, individuals who follow values, norms, customs, behavioral standers.  
Those who accept the ‘rational men’ view will believe that people calculate the benefits of breaking 
the law and the expected value of sanction for that and only if the latter is higher will they follow the 
law. This approach is also called instrumental or deterrence approach, emphasizing the role of 
sanctions. This approach may be relatively simple, though issues like information and information 
asymmetry, attitudes towards risk, and the perceived probability and size of sanction (vis-à-vis real 
data on these factors) make the model significantly more complex. This model is perfectly adequate 
for the economics approach, and economist did a lot for better understanding in this regard. (Becker, 
1968; Posner, 1985; Stigler, 1970) Later a whole new discipline, Law & Economics was based on this 
approach and became dominant by the 1990s in legal scholarship and remained so for one or two 
decades.  
According to the ‘social men’ view people basically follow – largely unconsciously – social norms. This 
approach, however, unlike the rationalistic approach with its one explanatory model of utility 
maximizing, suggest several potential paths explaining how and why social men obey the law. The 
role of social norms may be greatly different or even contradicting in these theories. People may, and 
presumably typically do follow the law because the behavior required by the law coincides with 
moral standards or customs. Most rules of the classical legal fields (criminal law; property law, 
contract law) may fit into this category. E.g. criminal law punishes murder or theft but most of us do 
not commit these acts because of the existence of modern law but because of internal moral 
inhibition. It has been discussed widely in psychological and socio psychological  literature why 
people follow these non-legal social standards, frequently unconsciously, somewhat automatically. 
Socialization, especially early childhood may play a major role; following/copying the appreciated 
persons’ behavior (parents first, respected group members later, etc.). What is the role of 
unconscious learning, copying others, conscious learning in order to fit to a group? How informal 
sanctions (from, a sudden silence in a discussion, through an angry look, to ostracize from a 
community? These are important questions none of which has been fully answered.  
Perhaps the most important distinction within the socially motivated compliance category is 
between (a) obeying the laws because we accept that laws must generally be obeyed (e.g. 
irrespective of the circumstances and the content of the specific law), and (b) every other reasons of 
norm-driven compliance. This is summed up in the below graph. 





The two approaches within norm-based compliance may easily conflict with each other in everyday 
life. This happens in every case when we face a law that we do not agree with or even find it highly 
immoral. This conflict provides an excellent topic for everyday discussion, for the literature (see for 
instance Antigone) and moral, political and legal philosophy (e.g. if that is right to kill the tyrant). If 
one’s behavior is described according to model (a), she will obey the law that she finds unjust, 
whereas if model (b) is valid, she will break the law to satisfy her inner conviction.3 It is also 
important to see that historically model (a) is quite new, it is related to the establishment of the 
modern state and legal system. This is exactly the wider theoretical frame (i.e.: rationalization in the 
modern Occidental cultures) in which Weber discusses the issue.  
The major problem with Weber’s model is perhaps its uncertain status between the above described 
two categories (i.e. rational vs. social men). Weber’s model fits into his theory of rationalization. 
However, Weber’s interpretation of the term is largely different from the ‘rationality’ as used by 
contemporary economists or typically also by social scientists.4 It does not reflect directly to utility 
maximization. Whereas goals-means logic is part of Weber’s term of ‘rationality’ it contains several 
other factors, that do not fit to the contemporary mainstream concept of rationality. In fact, it is 
quite difficult to categorize Weber’s legitimacy theory within the above dichotomy. Is that rational 
calculation or is that a norm-driven behavior that makes legal norms accepted in modern society? 
The legalistic authority may be summed up as an – unconditional, non-reflected and basically 
irrational –   belief in rationality. Or, to enlighten the paradox in another way: legalistic legitimacy 
presumes a social (i.e. non-legal) norm that assures that people obey the laws even if that is against 
their social norms. In other words Weber presumes a general social norm that suppresses all other 
                                                          
3 All these speculations are relevant only, of course, if the given person is aware of the legal regulation. If she 
does not know the law, which may be quite frequently the case, these issues of conflicting norms is not 
activated.   
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social norms in favor of the legal norms, just because those were created in a formal manner by the 
state, which is quite alien to normal social norms. In spite of these contradiction that one may sense 
in Weber’s theory, the major problem is, at least in my view, that he does not provide a reliable 
motivational theory. It is very difficult to believe that people accept the law just because it was 
created in a formally appropriate manner; especially if we presume, or know from empirical evidence 
that most people do not even know what the ‘appropriate manner’ is (i.e. what is the law-making 
process, which entities may create, which types of laws, how laws may be known, etc.). 
Indeed, scholarly discussion on why people do obey laws (and why should they) has been present 
almost since laws (i.e. behavioral norms, made by government entities) exist. Undoubtedly, this is a 
crucial question of legal sociology. Still, seemingly most legal scholars and even professionals seem to 
have in mind two elements when (if ever) thinking about the reasons of social compliance with laws. 
If asked, they would refer to deterrence by sanction, and acceptance of the law as one to be followed 
in every circumstance, due to its special way of creation.  
Tom R. Tyler’s theory and its critique 
More recently Tom R. Tyler’s theory seems to dominate the discussion on this academic field. Tyler 
states that the procedural justice of law enforcement activities, as perceived by the affected parties, 
is the key factor of law-abiding behavior. It is the fairness of procedures and not the sanction that 
works. Sanction may even appear as an unfair official action that typically alienates the community 
from law enforcing authorities. An overview of the argument is summed up in an encyclopedia entry, 
summarized in the following excerpt: 
In this entry we argue that a deterrence model of legal authority is not only expensive and minimally 
effective; it also undermines forms of social capital that promote long-term public commitment to the 
law and, crucially, the public cooperation on which legal authorities fundamentally rely. The exercise 
of authority via the application of fair process strengthens the social bonds between individuals and 
authorities. Procedural justice promotes normative modes of compliance and cooperation that are 
both more stable and more sustainable in the long run. (p. 4012)  
In other words, detection and sanctioning is not only ineffective and costly but systematic sanctions 
may even alienate people from authorities (i.e. police). Some empirical studies seem to prove this 
conclusion even stating that sanctions do not increase, rather decrease compliance among citizens. 
(Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, & Madensen, 2006) and more recently (Murphy, Bradford, & Jackson, 
2016) reached a clear negative relationship between – self assessed – deterrence and compliance. 
These findings are somewhat shocking taking into account that governments and legal systems have 
been based for several millennia on the belief that law exerts its effect mostly via the sanctions. 
Others (e.g. Nagin, 1998), searching various empirical studies  found that, while the effectiveness and 
efficiency of sanctions may be questionable, a preventing effect is undoubtedly present.  
Neither the limits of this paper, nor the presumed competencies of the author does allow a detailed 
critical overview of Tyler’s theory and – perhaps more importantly – of the large stream of empirical 
research based on that theory here. Still, a few remarks may be acceptable.  
First, what is (and what is not) procedural justice? How do we interpret and then operationalize this 
concept?. Tyler first (Tyler, 1990) treats procedural justice as an opposite pole to distributive justice. 
In the above mentioned encyclopedia the authors provide a four item list of major elements of 
procedural justice, which are, on one hand, acceptable, widely shared procedural principles, on the 
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other hand, they may contradict one another (especially for minorities). One of these requirements is 
the neutral, unbiased treatment, based on legal principles. Another suggests respect to the client (i.e. 
perpetuator) and handling the case in a way that serves best the client’s interest. My general 
statement that these two may easily get into conflict, especially in case of different cultures. This is 
most self-evident in case of substantive laws both from practice (e.g. traditional Muslim values in the 
British society) and from the literature.  
Tyler’s theory, in my view, is based on the implicit presumption that ideas about fairness are roughly 
the same in every culture and in every societal arrangement. Otherwise, acting in a way that is 
perceived fair by all communities in a given society requires from the authorities the (a) knowledge 
of the given communities values and (b) the readiness and ability to follow those values. This latter 
requirement means that either (b.a) the general law and the given communities’ moral and 
behavioral standers fit perfectly together, or (b.b) that the authorities are ready to apply laws in a 
kind of ‘relaxed’ way, i.e. in favor of the client who has broken the law.  
This problem is related to at least two classical tenets in legal scholarship (traditional or sociological). 
First the idea, attributed to Durkheim, that in modern, largely anomic societies there is no anymore a 
generally shared set of values. 5  The only general normative system of modern societies is law. Law is 
the only common denominator that the authorities required to follow and, which is expected to be 
followed by all citizens. Durkheim in this regard sees law very similarly to Weber. The major question 
in both theories of these two great social theoreticians (fathers of sociology), which in my view 
basically remained unanswered is “why people would obey the law”; in other words, what is the 
psychological, motivational reason of the readiness to accept laws as such? Tyler’s theory may be 
considered as an attempt to answer this question. However, it cannot handle the problem of diverse 
cultures of various communities within the same society. This problem is more self-evident in case of 
substantial laws, presumably related to distributive justice and perhaps less to procedural justice, but 
most likely the controversy exists in this latter case as well. 
Another classical theoretical controversy – probably concealed in English by the term ‘equity’ 
embedding both elements – is between the requirement of unbiased treatment and the requirement 
to treat every case reflecting on its specificity. Treating each individual (irrespective of any aspect 
that is not directly related to the case; e.g. religion, race, appearance of the person, sympathy of the 
decision-maker) equally is a general requirement. Only elements relevant to the case can be taken 
into account for a legal decision and it is the law that determines what is relevant. Treating everyone 
equally in a legally equal case is the key value of civil law systems. On the other hand, it is also a 
crucial requirement that each case and each individual is different and they deserve a careful 
consideration of the specificity of the case, not just the blind classification under certain paragraphs. 
This approach is very strong in the common law tradition, as it may be captured in the simple, but 
legally also relevant principle of ‘fairness’. 6 
                                                          
5 As (Silbey, 2013, p. 10) sums it up: “Durkheim argued that law had become the embodiment of the collective 
conscience - the links and glue of human transaction - in an age of interdependent connections. Within 
societies that had an advanced division of labor, where  social and functional heterogeneity rather than 
similarity prevailed, law displaced religion as the source of generally shared  norms and expectations…” 
6 This principle appears in such ancient Roman wisdom such as “summum ius summa iniuria”, the generally 
(irrespective of the specificity of the case) applied law is the greatest injustice.  
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I argue here that these two requirements, treating everyone equally, categorizing actions according 
to the law, and, on the other hand, fairly, with an eye on the specificity of the case are easily 
contradict each other and this occurs in case of procedures and procedural justice.  
In fact this difference may be the main difference regarding the modern legal systems, the Anglo-
American common law, and the civil law systems. As Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo (2007) emphasize, 
the key for the civil law tradition is predictability, that is each case classified under the same legal 
rules are decided in the same way, irrespective of any elements of the case not identified as ‘legally 
relevant’ by the written law itself. The common law, on the other hand, treats each and every case as 
specific and emphasizes fairness in the specific given case. It is not difficult to realize that the two 
legal systems are dominated by highly different procedural values and these values may conflict in a 
given case.  
Tyler’s theory seems to neglect these conflicting values and/or – not surprisingly, consciously or in a 
non-reflected manner – stands on the side of common law procedural values. The issue may seem 
overly theoretical. In fact it is not; it is crucial for the conception of deterrence. Following the first 
approach, preferred by Tyler, circumventing strict sanctioning by authorities in certain cases may 
increase the feeling of fair treatment in certain communities, that may increase the acceptance of 
the legal system and authorities and the potential cooperation level in the future. Having a look at on 
this story from a different angle, say from that of the civil law systems, the same conduct of the 
authorities are strongly questionable, may be considered as biased, even arbitrary and thus highly 
unfair action of authorities. It could be conceived as misuse of legal authority or even a clear sign of 
corruption. Please note, that this is not just a general problem of conflicting values but this refers to 
conflicts between legal values, and specifically between procedural legal values.  
I argue here, that Tyler either neglects the contradiction between two conflicting procedural legal 
principles, that are both theoretically and practically highly relevant, or he simply accepts one by 
neglecting the other in an ethnocentric manner.  
Second, Tyler’s theory is based on the ‘social men’ – referring back to the dichotomy by March & 
Olsen (2004) – who follows moral and behavioral standards of a community, of groups, or who fulfills 
role expectations, etc. – depending on psychological, social psychological or anthropological 
approaches. This standpoint is why Tyler may deny the use (efficiency and effectiveness) of 
deterrence. However, an increasing number of entities subjected to law are not individuals, are not 
humans but organizations. Some, or most of these organizations per se do not reveal human 
features. Furthermore, most of these organizations function in a ‘social system’ as described by 
Jurgen Hebermas (1985) and other scholars, like (Luhmann, 1995). The systems enforce their own 
‘logic’ on participants, in a way much more cruelly than modern law does. Those who do not obey 
this logic are sanctioned, and relatively quickly selected out, by a way of systemic ‘death penalty’. 
The most obvious and well-known example is market economy. Most economists, including such 
diverse approaches as Marxist and neo-classical economists, agree that the market enforces 
efficiency and if the requirement of market efficiency contrasts with any other aspect, including 
moral, aesthetic and other consideration or even legal rules the former prevails. Firms in a market 
strive to make the best decisions based on rational calculation. Those who fail to make rational 
decisions cease to exist. Accordingly, laws are followed only if that worth to do so. Actors must 
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calculate costs (expected value of sanction) and benefits of breaking the law and their decision will 
be based on this rational calculation.  
In other words, Tyler’s theory – irrespective of any other potential critiques – is per se invalid for a 
large number of actors, organizations that are aimed by an increasing number of laws. For instance 
Silbey (2013), in her paper analyzing a century of regulatory enforcement literature, finds the fact 
that organization appear in an increasing number and importance as legal subjects as a major 
challenge of modern legal systems.  
A critical view on empirical studies  
My final comment refers to the enormous number of empirical studies that have been published in 
the past two decades testing of and elaborating on Tyler’s theory. Most of these studies seem to 
basically support the theory. Most surprising may be those studies that empirically indicate a 
negative relationship between compliance and deterrence(Jackson et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2016), 
suggesting, quite counter-intuitively but in a way supporting Tyler’s theory, that deterrence improves 
rather than reduces the chance for infringement of laws.  
Almost all of these studies measure compliance on a self-reported basis. Compliance is not detected 
or observed; instead people are asked in a way if they follow the laws and these answers are used as 
a dependent variable explained by other variables that are also based on the respondents’ answers 
to other questions. It is a general methodological question of how reliable people’s answer are in 
questionnaire surveys, especially if that is used as an indicator of people’s real behavior. The issue 
have been widely discussed in the methodological literature as ‘social desirability’ and ‘acquiescence 
bias’, when the respondents attempts to provide answers that she thinks is appropriate, according to 
general social values and/or the interviewer. It seems self-evident that this danger is exceptionally 
high if the behavior at hand refers to serious breaking of social norms, such as infringement of laws, 
e.g. not paying taxes that is an extensively studied field. While this is a general problem of survey 
methods it may appear to quite a different extent and quite a different type in various countries. 
Table 1 shows data that are estimates of real tax evasion and the citizens’ self-reported attitude to 
tax evasion as a behavior.  
1. Table Tax evasion as a percent of collected tax and the acceptance of tax evasion by citizens7 
Country US Brazil Italy Russia Germany France Japan UK Spain 
Tax evasion as 
% of tax 
collected 




2,6 3,62 2,18 3,03 2,2 2,83 1,46 2,28 2,06 
Correl. coef.: 0,638 
        
 
                                                          
7 The size of tax evasion is calculated by the author from data provided at Guardien DataBlog. 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/sep/27/tax-evasion-how-much-does-it-cost-a-country). 
The acceptance of tax evasion is the mean value of answers given in the country, within the World Value 
Survey, wave 5 (2005-2009), to the question of how justifiable is it… “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance”, 
measured on a 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable) scale.  
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The table indicates that though there is a relationship between subjective moral evaluation of tax 
evasion and the factual measure of tax evasion the relationship on a country unit level is not very 
strong. The correlation is not significant (p=0,064). It seems especially clear that while Russia is not 
the most morally permissive, closer to France or even the US than to Brazil, tax evasion is far the 
largest in this country. Of course, several reasonable objection may be raised against this simplistic, 
almost primitive argument. First, data are measured on country level, not the level of individual, 
which may be especially relevant if individual and organizational behavior differs greatly in the 
country, or there is a strong cultural fragmentation in the country in this regard. Second, this 
question does not refer to factual tax evasion by the respondents, but to the moral assessment of 
such an act. Third, companies that may be responsible for a large proportion of tax evasion naturally 
are not in the survey. However, most likely the difference would be even higher, regarding such a 
question, at least in the post-communist region. In brief, self-reported compliance as the main 
dependent variable raises serious doubts generally about the validity and reliability of such research 
and it seems especially vulnerable to this failure in post-communist countries and probably several 
other parts of the non-Anglo-American World.  
As a next step most of the studies follow the routine logic of hypothesis testing, working with one 
dependent, and one or typically more independent variables, with possible mediating variables (a 
typical direction in recent studies). This arrangement sets up the logic of analysis and thus conceals 
the fact that what researchers could find is the statistical relationship between the measured 
variables.  
Let’s have a look at on a very intelligent, sophisticated research following a time series research 
design, asking tax offenders in three points of time by Murphy et al. (2016)! The authors set up a 
relatively complex structural equation model (frequently used in this type of studies) to test the 
relationship between procedural justice and compliance mediated via legitimacy and social identity 
(identification with certain groups such as ‘law abiding people’ by the respondent). Compliance 
variable here again is based on self-reporting, though the respondents were selected from tax office 
data as tax evading persons, and the research took several years, that may allow collecting data again 
on those who remained in the sample. (The authors did not explicate why did they not do so; e.g. 
research ethics, unavailability of data.) The importance of these mediating variables convincingly 
described in the first part of the paper. An additional element, stigmatization serves as a variable 
related to social identity, Another additional variable, morality, is much less discussed. The model is 
depicted in graphical form of a path model where arrows show the presumed cause-effect 
relationships. There are four variables that are in direct, explanatory relationship to compliance of 
which ‘morality’ has far the strongest explanatory power, whereas deterrence has the weakest and 
negative effect. This diagram serves then as the basis of testing the hypotheses set up by the 
authors. The model itself and its graphical presentation with the arrows conceals the fact that the 
basis of it are the statistical relationships, which by definition do not have a direction. It is difficult to 
resist an alternative interpretation of the same statistical relationship, that is, we have of indicators 
of the respondents’ attitudes towards authorities, their behavior, legitimacy, law abiding behavior 
and morality which are interrelated and correlate as all are segments of individual’s psyche. In other 
words, these data may have much more to do with psychology than legal sociology, with impressions 
and attitudes than with facts. My impression is that the same data may be much better explained 
from this perspective. ‘Morality’ may be the central element that may be strongly related to all other 
variables of the model, which however, is not measured in the model. Most interesting is the 
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significant, negative relationship between ‘deterrence’ and ‘compliance’. A glance on the well 
documented variable list reveals that ‘deterrence’ is measured by one question only, namely: “What 
do you think the chances are that you will be caught claiming $5000 as work deductions when the 
expenses have nothing to do with work?”. If one is not bound by the model logic it is easy to realize 
that the relationship makes perfect sense in the opposite way. It is not that ‘deterrence, i.e. 
perceived chance of sanction decreases compliance’, rather: ‘compliance minimizes the chance of 
sanction’. This, self-evident interpretation, however, is eliminated by the research model.  
Several empirical studies whose findings seem to support Tyler’s theory, while methodologically are 
highly professional, in some quite basic elements are systematically questionable. Most importantly 
almost all studies are based on self-reported compliance data that can be conceived more as the 
expression of the respondents’ psyche conditioned by the survey situation, than an indication of real 
behavior.   
Several of these issues that may be generally raised about the research are specifically relevant in 
CEE and probably generally in a non-Anglo-American context.  
 
Some relevant empirical data 
At this early stage of research I will attack only two issues relying on three empirical research sets. 
First I will provide a review of research findings regarding Hungarian people’s self-reported 
motivation for obeying the law. Based on these data, I will argue that sanctions, at least in a society 
like Hungary, are important. Second, I will argue that distributive justice seems more important than 
procedural fairness, based on Hungarian citizens’ report in a representative survey.  
Why people obey the law – according to the people 
A representative questionnaire survey (CAVI) of one thousand Hungarian citizens over the age of 18 
was administered early December in 2015. The survey was carried out under the research project 
investigating “Hungarian legal consciousness” (OTKA 105552). The questionnaire referred to legal 
culture of respondents, including questions on beliefs about and attitudes towards law and the legal 
system. In this questionnaire we asked people directly why they do obey the law. We have offered 
five potential answers that had to be ranked by importance. The results are presented in Table 2.   
2. Table Why do you personally obey the laws? (the smaller the mean the higher the assessed importance) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
you do not want to be punished 2,62 1,382 
you agree with most of the rules and you keep those 2,85 1,211 
you do not want others to scandalize you, to judge you 3,82 1,261 
basically, laws are in your best interest, too. 2,97 1,305 
you think that laws must always be followed, regardless of anything else 2,74 1,562 
 
Seemingly the first choice of respondents, measured by the mean, is to avoid sanctions. This data 
surely does not support the theory that disregards or even denies the importance of deterrence. The 
second choice refers to the general principle that laws must always be obeyed. Please note, that this 
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statement, as it was formulated, implies that procedural fairness is considered irrelevant by those 
who fully supported this statement. The survey originally did not aim at testing Tyler’s theory, thus 
unfortunately we have not offered an alternative answer referring to the conceived procedural 
fairness of the authorities. Still the data seem to prove that deterrence – at least as people conceive 
it – plays a crucial role that raise doubts about Tyler’s theory.  
A non-representative survey carried out by four students during late March, early April in 2013, at 
bus stops in the center of Budapest, the capitol far the largest city of Hungary. Students had to 
approach those smoking near (not in) bus stops and asked thirteen, typically quite simple, questions, 
mainly about the reason of respondents’ behavior. The questionnaire was designed in a way that it 
can be quickly asked and filled in by the students, as if the bus arrived, the interview situation ended. 
For the same reason basic socio-demographic data: age, wealth and education level (each measured 
in three or four categories, besides gender) assessed by the students were recorded immediately 
after the interview. 
A few month before this survey was carried out, a new law was adopted stipulating that smoking was 
prohibited in bus stops; smokers need to stay at least five meters away from these places. Students 
asked those who smoked further away from the bus stops why do they do so. First, they asked if the 
respondents had heard about the new regulation, and for those who answered positively (95% of the 
respondents)8 we offered the five potential reasons and asked to evaluate their importance on a 1 
(not at all important) to 5 (very important) scale.9 It is important to emphasize that unlike almost all 
studies that rely on self-reported compliance, in this case the real compliance was observed and 
questions about reasons of compliance was addressed to those who in fact complied. Results are 
presented in Table 3. 
3. Table Answers of these who follow the law limiting smoking (the higher the mean the higher the assessed importance) 
 
Sanction again appears as the most important self-reported item of inducing law-abiding behavior. 
However, in this specific case the fact that respondents agreed with the decision (not to smoke in the 
middle of crowd) and that came out as the second most important element, whereas the general 
principle that laws always must be followed received a somewhat lower mean value. The two other 
items that were supposed to test the effect of group remained quite low, possibly as the ‘social 
group’ in this case is a set of ad hoc unknown people. Still, even here, being seen sanctioned 
generates more discomfort then having been scandalized. The last two questions asked about how 
                                                          
8 When asked „Why do you smoke here?” 63% immediately mentioned the law, and on further question „Have 
you heard about the law…” only 5% give a negative answer. 93% of the respondents said that they knew they 
may have been fined by the police for smoking in the bus stop and 52% said that they know the maximum 
measure of fine, too.  
9 The same scale is used in school grading in Hungary, thus it was easily manageable for everyone.   
10 Note that in this case we did not use ranking but a Likert scale, thus, unlike previously, the higher values 
mean higher importance.  
I smoke here, further away from the bus stop because…  Mean10 Stdv. 
I do not want to be punished  3,63 1,33 
I’d feel ashamed if others see as I am caught red handed/ and sanctioned  2,84 1,24 
I agree with this rule and that’s why I follow it  3,52 1,30 
Laws must always be followed, that’s why I follow this one too  3,43 1,14 
I do not want others to scandalize me  2,65 1,24 
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the respondents would behave if they knew that smoking in the bus stop (infringement of the law) 
will surely be not punished? 67.2% of the respondents said that without the threat of sanctions they 
would not follow the law. Quite surprisingly, 57% (!) of those who claimed on another question that 
they agree with this rule said that they would not follow the rule, that otherwise they agree with, if 
no sanctions applied.11  
We also asked respondents, with an open question, why they would not follow the law. A very 
characteristic answer that appears several times, though perhaps in a less sharp format was this: “It’s 
silly! Laws are to enforce obedience. It would be perfectly senseless if no one checks if people obey 
and no one punishes those who don’t. “ 
In sharp contrast with the theory that deterrence is largely irrelevant, average Hungarian citizens 
mentioned sanctions as the most important motivators of law abiding behavior. We received an 
identical result when testing a representative sample and when asking people who factually followed 
a given rule. This latter research, while not being representative, is based on observed compliance; in 
sharp contrast with the overwhelming majority of studies in this field based on self-reported 
compliance. While the question indicating the role of deterrence is not contrasted by questions 
referring to procedural justice they are contrasted with four other potential causes of compliance, all 
being scored below ‘deterrence’.  
There may be several potential explanations of these findings that deserve further investigation. At 
this point they may be presented only as feeble hypotheses. First, possibly the law perceived as an 
entity whose inevitable attribute is legal sanction in case of non-compliance.12 This interpretation of 
the law may be much stronger in civil law countries, as here the law is conceived as an act of the 
government. Furthermore, public law enforcement, at least in the European continent, plays a much 
larger role compared to private enforcement, than in the Anglo-American world. A large number of 
regulatory agencies of the executive are trusted to continuously monitor compliance and punish 
detected non-compliance in a wide range of fields. Other parts of our representative survey, not to 
be reviewed here in detail, also indicated that law is typically conceived, in this cognitive frame: as a 
highly formal, suppressive phenomenon by which the government regulates (or supposed to 
regulate) ‘others’ in order to assure public interest. 
Second, predictable, definite sanctioning of evident infringements of laws may be expected by the 
majority of the population. This expectation, however, has not been met after the collapse of 
communism and the following chaotic period. As elsewhere I have proven (Gajduschek, 2008, 2015), 
sanctioning law-breaking behavior in Hungary has been highly ineffective. Due to the lack of 
appropriate regulations, appropriate government capacity and several other interdependent reasons 
exacerbating governmental incapacity, it is a typical experience of citizens that laws are not enforced. 
                                                          
11 This fact provoked intensive discussion among Hungarian scholars looking for potential explanation. Extreme 
level of anomy on, social level, and/or extreme level of material values  (Inglehart, 1997), i.e. utility 
maximization irrespective of others’ utility, opinion, and irrespective of social norms, on individual level, 
appeared as potentially most plausible explanations. 
12 Indeed, a central tenet that every law student learn at Hungarian law faculties at an early stage of their 
studies is that legal norms consist of three elements: the ‘condition’ the ‘order’ and the ‘punishment’; following 
somehow the “IF – THEN – ELSE” logic. In Anglo-American law schools typically two such elements are 
mentioned: the ‘protasis’ and ‘adopsis’ (Twining & Miers, 2010, p. 132). There certainly is a relationship 
between professional and general-social legal culture; i.e. internal and external legal culture. (Friedman, 1975) 
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Deterrence has hardly worked at all. Kagan and his colleagues, while emphasizing the importance of 
other factors, also refer to the importance of deterrence. Interestingly and also very intelligently, in 
the authors’ interpretation the function of penalty is not solely a rational element, not simply 
information to rational calculation. Penalty for law-breakers has a very strong emotional and moral 
message to the members of society at large. 
To summarise, some significant level of legal enforcement - although it is not that clear quite how 
much - is undoubtedly essential in generating and assuring compliance. Enforcement is important first 
of all in the communicating regulatory norms and threatening credible levels of monitoring and legal 
sanctions for noncompliance; second, for its reminder effect (‘check your speedometer!’); and third, 
for its reassurance effect (‘you’re not a fool to comply; we are really looking for and finding the bad 
apples’). (Kagan, Gunningham, & Thornton, 2011, p. 52) 
These factors were all missing in post-communist transition Hungary. In fact it worked on the 
opposite direction, as the lack of relatively predictable punishment of perpetrators sent out the 
message that you may break the laws, do not need to care about speeding, etc. It has been a general 
experience of ordinary people, that law-breaking remain typically unpunished and those who want to 
are easily able to infringe the laws without any negative consequence. Thus the general atmosphere 
increasingly suggested that if you obey the law, you are fool.13 In this context a strict and stringent 
application of legal penalties, with a declared disregard for the specificity of the case, for 
perpetrators explanations and extenuation, may be considered by the society as proof of fairness; 
though I have difficulties to decide if this is procedural or distributive justice.  
Distributive vs. procedural justice 
Tyler considers procedural justice generally a key to legitimacy, acceptance of laws and the basis of 
cooperation with law enforcing authorities. Originally (Tyler, 1990), he explicitly contrasted distribute 
and procedural justice to prove that the latter plays decisive role. Later, a large number of studies 
seemed to prove this statement, typically identifying distributive justice with the content of the 
decision, i.e. was that favorable or unfavorable for the client.  
Testing this issue I rely on the data of a questionnaire survey carried out on a 2003 person 
representative sample by Gallup Hungary in 2008.14 The survey aimed at assessing general customer 
satisfaction with administrative-regulatory public services. One question listed various aspects of 
public administrative activities and asked about the relative importance of these items. Respondents 
needed to name the first, second and third most important item from the list. Table 4. sums up the 
results. 
  
                                                          
13 As elsewhere I argued: “The perception that regulatory agencies systematically fail to enforce laws spreads 
over time in the society, exacerbating noncompliance and inducing a vicious circle where high level of 
noncompliance meets regulatory incapacity that exacerbates noncompliance, and so on. In the end, those 
following rules may be considered as ‘losers’, and breaking norms may become a norm itself.” (Gajduschek, 
2015, p. 122) 
14 A similar survey was administered in 2005, and to the best of my knowledge, recently too but I could not 
obtain any information on the latter one and only the Report of the 2005 is available to me, whereas I could 
obtain the data file of the 2008 survey.  
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4. Table Importance of various aspects of the procedure15 
Evaluation criteria Value Ranking 
simplicity of the procedure 91 1 
short time to stay in queue 67 2 
cost of procedure, i.e. low administrative fees 57 3 
expertise of the administrator 56 4 
keeping deadlines precisely 31 5 
closing the case quickly 30 6 
transparency 29 7 
availability of information about the procedures 20 8 
understandability of the procedure  17 9 
politeness 9 10 
lack of corruption  8 12 
offices be easy to get to 8 13 
office hours  8 11 
nice office environment where procedure takes place 5 14 
opportunity to appeal against the decision 1 15 
 
It may be difficult to assess how much the above elements are related to procedural and to 
distributive justice and furthermore how much they are considered relevant from the point of view 
of Tyler’s theory. For instance, whereas the opportunity to appeal is considered a perhaps most 
important procedural justice element by lawyers, understandably, it plays hardly any role in Tyler’s 
theory. Politeness, transparency, lack of corruption, on the other hand, are undoubtedly central 
issues in procedural justice as conceived by Tyler. I indicate in the table with underlining those items. 
Several other items may fit better to distributive justice, if that is interpreted here as the clients’ 
utility maximizing attitude. Minimizing money “cost of procedure16” is undoubtedly such an item. I 
consider also professional expertise of the administrator as such one. I indicated these items with 
bold letters. Some other items, such as “short time to stay in queue”, “closing the case quickly” seem 
to be such items too but one may argue that these could be interpreted also as procedural items. 
There are some items that seem more as procedural elements (e.g. office hours) but one may argue 
that it could be understood from a utility maximizing point of view (e.g. no need to do leave at 
working hours). Items that were difficult to decide are indicated with italics.  
It may be easy to see that elements that are identified with distributive justice are much higher on 
the list than procedural justice elements. Surely, items that are explicitly named by Tyler (e.g. Tyler, 
Jackson, & Bradford, 2014, pp. 4017–4018) and indicated with underlining are in the second half of 
the list of importance. Items indicated with bold based on my assessment, are on the first part of the 
list. I see a similar trend between items with italic. Namely, items that may rather be interpreted as 
                                                          
15 The „value” data were calculated by taking into account how frequently an item was ranked on the first, 
second, third place and this value was then standardized to a 0-100 sale. 
16 In the previous survey carried out in 2005 costs were far the most important item in a similar question.  
14 
 
ones related to distributive justice appear higher and those related more to procedural justice 
appear in the lower part of the list.  
These data are far from decisive; still they may raise doubts about the ultimate generality of 
procedural justice as a panacea to inducing law-abiding behavior. Potentially, the state of the society, 
to a great extent the welfare of the society could be a key factor, somewhat similarly to Maslow’s 
famous “theory of needs”. While the theory has been widely and reasonably criticized for its uniform 
treatment of people, generally it could be accepted the physiological needs are first and all others 
come only after that. It may be accepted to the common sense that in a poverty stricken society 
where a lot, in extreme cases even survival of the client (think of developing countries), may depend 
on an administrative decision, the outcome may be more important than the procedure. It is true on 
the other hand, to refer now to Herzberg’s two factor motivational theory, that this may not induce 
emotional identification with the authority. (Petri & Govern, 2013) However, it may induce law-
abiding behavior, even if that is not via the socio-psychological mechanisms described by Tyler. 
Conclusion 
Above, I raised some general reservations regarding Tyler’s theory emphasizing the role of 
procedural justice, the need of authorities’ client oriented approach. Moreover, I questioned the 
approach that almost completely denies the role of deterrence (legal sanctions) in generating 
compliance. This theoretical part undoubtedly needs further improvement. The empirical part is only 
in en embryonic form, providing descriptive data on two issues: why people, in Hungary, obey the 
law in their own view and what is considered important in law enforcement, in regulatory-inspection 
agencies’ activities?  
Both on a theoretical level and with empirical data I argued that Tyler’s theory may be less relevant 
in countries that  
a) have a different (civil law) legal system with all its structural and cultural consequences ; 
b) where the welfare of citizens is low and administrative decisions may have a large impact on 
their lives;  
c) the culture of society is largely different (e.g. more materialistic); 
d) the social experience is largely different (e.g. not that laws are strictly enforced but that they 
are generally not enforced at all). 
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